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N O T I C E 
 
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN WILLIAM HARTE, JR., PETITIONER 
 
Petitioner was disbarred, retroactive to September 22, 2009.  In the Matter of 
John William Harte, Jr., 395 S.C. 144, 716 S.E.2d 918 (2011).  Petitioner has 
now filed a petition seeking to be reinstated. 
 
Pursuant to Rule 33(e)(2) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, notice is 
hereby given that members of the bar and the public may file a notice of their 
opposition to or concurrence with the petition.  Comments should be mailed 
to: 
 
    Committee   on   Character   and   Fitness 
    P.   O.   Box   11330 
    Columbia,   South   Carolina   29211 
 
These comments should be received within sixty (60) days of the date of this 
notice. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January 10, 2017 
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______________________ 
______________________ 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina 

RE: Interest Rate on Money Decrees and Judgments 

ORDER
S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20 (B) (Supp. 2016) provides that the legal rate of interest on 
money decrees and judgments “is equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of
the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which the damages are 
awarded, plus four percentage points, compounded annually. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court shall issue an order by January 15 of each year confirming the annual 
prime rate. This section applies to all judgments entered on or after July 1, 2005.  For 
judgments entered between July 1, 2005, and January 14, 2006, the legal rate of 
interest shall be the first prime rate as published in the first edition of the Wall Street 
Journal after January 1, 2005, plus four percentage points.”   
The Wall Street Journal for January 3, 2017, the first edition after January 1, 2017, 
listed the prime rate as 3.75%. Therefore, for the period January 15, 2017, through 
January 14, 2018, the legal rate of interest for judgments and money decrees is 7.75% 
compounded annually. 
/s/ Donald W. Beatty C.J. 
          FOR THE COURT 
Columbia, South Carolina
January 4, 2017 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Frank Barnwell McMaster, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001527 
Opinion No. 27697 

Heard November 30, 2016 – Filed January 11, 2017 

DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Disciplinary Counsel Lesley M. Coggiola and 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Joseph P. Turner both 
of Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Frank Barnwell McMaster, of West Columbia, pro se. 
PER CURIAM: In this disciplinary matter, neither the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel ("ODC") nor respondent take exception to the Commission on Lawyer 
Conduct Panel's ("Panel") recommendation that respondent be: suspended for 
thirty months retroactive to March 2014; required to pay the costs of the 
disciplinary proceedings; and required to comply with ongoing monitoring 
conditions. We agree respondent committed misconduct, and accept the Panel's
recommendation. 
FACTS
In 2013, respondent was arrested and charged with driving under the influence 
("DUI"), first offense; failure to give or giving improper signal; and hit and run 
involving property damage. He pleaded guilty to DUI and improper turn; the 
remaining charge was dismissed.  Respondent paid a fine. 
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Approximately one year later, respondent was arrested and charged with use of a 
firearm while under the influence of alcohol or drugs; disorderly conduct; and 
damaging/tampering with a vehicle.  He pleaded guilty to unlawful carrying of a 
pistol and again paid a fine.  Shortly after his arrest for the second incident, this 
Court placed respondent on interim suspension.  See In re McMaster, 407 S.C. 
213, 755 S.E.2d 107 (2014). 
In November 2015, respondent and the ODC entered into a stipulation of facts, 
followed by the filing of formal charges on February 1, 2016.  The formal charges 
assert respondent committed misconduct as defined in Rule 7(a), RLDE, and Rule 
413, SCACR, by violating: (1) Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 407, SCACR, in that he committed criminal acts that reflect adversely on his 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; and (2) any other rule the Panel or 
Court might deem violated by respondent's conduct.  The stipulation of facts 
provides:  
(1) on April 29, 2013, respondent was arrested and 
charged with DUI, first offense; failure to give or giving 
improper signal; and hit and run with property damage, 
resulting in respondent pleading guilty to DUI and 
improper turn in December 2013;
(2) on February 20, 2014, respondent was arrested and 
charged with use of a firearm while under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs; disorderly conduct; and damaging or 
tampering with a vehicle, resulting in respondent 
pleading guilty to unlawful carrying of a pistol and 
forfeiting bond on the disorderly conduct charge;  
(3) Respondent submits the common thread in both 
incidents was alcohol abuse induced by depression 
associated with the dissolution of his marriage;
(4) Respondent sought help from a licensed physician 
who monitored respondent tri-monthly, and who 
submitted a letter dated March 4, 2015, addressed to 
respondent's attorney stating respondent is mentally and 
physically sound to practice law; 
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(5) In January 2015, Respondent signed a two year 
monitoring agreement with Lawyers Helping Lawyers 
requiring he remain alcohol-free and actively participate 
in Alcoholics Anonymous by attending at least two 
meetings per week; by all accounts respondent has 
complied with the agreement;   
(6) Respondent completed an evaluation at Carolina 
Psychiatric Services involving a Structured Diagnostic 
Interview and a psychiatric evaluation; the doctors 
completing both evaluations offered their professional 
opinion that respondent is capable of returning to the 
practice of law if he remains in treatment and maintains 
sobriety; and  
(7) Respondent has no prior disciplinary issues prior to 
the aforementioned incidents, and submits he "deeply 
regrets" his conduct and is ashamed of it. 
In April 2016, the Panel conducted an evidentiary hearing where respondent 
pledged his continued commitment to sobriety, rehabilitation, and the profession.  
The Panel's report noted aggravating and mitigating factors it considered, and 
recommended sanctions for respondent.  As to aggravating factors, the Panel noted 
respondent engaged in illegal conduct.  As to mitigating factors, the Panel noted: 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record; respondent's "full and free disclosure and 
cooperative attitude" in the disciplinary proceedings; and respondent's depression 
and dependency on alcohol.  The Panel then recommended respondent: (1) be 
suspended from the practice of law for a period of thirty months, retroactive to the 
commencement of his interim suspension—March 4, 2014; (2) pay the costs of the 
disciplinary proceedings;1 (3) complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program 
Ethics School prior to reinstatement; (4) enter into another two year contract with 
Lawyers Helping Lawyers;2 (5) continue treatment with his psychiatrist for a 
1 The costs of the disciplinary proceedings total: $402.20.  
2 The recommendation further requests Lawyers Helping Lawyers file quarterly 
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period of two years;3 and (6) continue treatment with his medical provider for his 
depression and anxiety for a period of two years.4  Neither the ODC nor respondent 
take exception to the Panel's recommendations.   
ANALYSIS 
The decision to discipline an attorney is within the sound discretion of the Court.  
In re White, 391 S.C. 581, 587, 707 S.E.2d 411, 414 (2011) (citation omitted).  
This Court "may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, 
conclusions[,] and recommendations of the Commission [on Lawyer Conduct]."  
Rule 27(e)(2), RLDE; Rule 413, SCACR.  "Although this Court is not bound by 
the findings of the Panel and Committee, these findings are entitled to great 
weight, . . ." In re Marshall, 331 S.C. 514, 519, 498 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998) (citing 
In re Yarborough, 327 S.C. 161, 165, 488 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1997)).  "The 'central 
purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the public from unscrupulous and 
indifferent lawyers.'" In re Brown, 361 S.C. 347, 355, 605 S.E.2d 509, 513 (2004) 
(per curiam) (quoting In re Hall, 333 S.C. 247, 251, 509 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1998) 
(per curiam)). "The primary purpose of . . . suspension is the removal of an unfit 
person from the profession for the protection of the courts and the public, not 
punishment of the offending attorney."  In re Brooks, 324 S.C. 105, 108, 477 
S.E.2d 98, 99 (1996) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
We find the Panel's recommendations are appropriate, and, therefore, suspend 
respondent for thirty months retroactive to March 4, 2014, require respondent to 
pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings, and adopt the Panel's 
recommendations as to ongoing monitoring of respondent's condition.  See In re
reports with the Commission during the two year contract period addressing 
respondent's compliance.   
3 The recommendation further requests the psychiatrist file quarterly reports with 
the Commission during the two year monitoring period addressing respondent's
progress and compliance with his treatment plan.   
4 The recommendation further requests the medical provider file quarterly reports 
with the Commission during the two year monitoring period addressing 
respondent's progress and compliance with his treatment plan.  
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Marshall, 331 S.C. at 519, 498 S.E.2d at 871; cf. In re Johnson, 386 S.C. 550, 560, 
689 S.E.2d 623, 629 (2010) (citing as a mitigating factor respondent's lack of prior 
disciplinary history); In re Woodruff, 313 S.C. 378, 380, 438 S.E.2d 227, 228 
(1993) ("While substance abuse is not a mitigating factor in attorney discipline 
matters, it is a factor in determining the appropriate sanction" (citation omitted)).  
We further caution respondent that pursuant to Rule 410, SCACR, he is required to 
ensure his contact information in the Attorney Information System ("AIS") is 
current and accurate, and failure to do so may result in his being held in contempt 
of court. See Rule 410(g), SCACR ("Persons admitted to the practice of law in
South Carolina shall have a continuing duty to verify and update their information 
in the AIS, and must ensure that the AIS information is current and accurate at all 
times. At a minimum, the contact information must include a mailing address, an 
e-mail address and a telephone number.  Members must update their contact 
information within five (5) days of any change"); see also In re Collie, 406 S.C. 
181, 749 S.E.2d 522 (2013) (placing a respondent on interim suspension for failure 
to follow the Court's directive to maintain current and accurate contact information 
in the AIS). 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice Costa 
M. Pleicones, concur. 
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Mattison Bogan, all of Nelson Mullins Riley & 
Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia; and Robert C. 
Calamari, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, of 
Myrtle Beach, for Appellant/Respondent.
John P. Henry and Philip C. Thompson, Sr., both of 
Thompson & Henry, P.A., of Conway, for 
Respondents/Appellants. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  These cases present cross-appeals from declaratory 
judgment actions to determine coverage under Commercial General Liability 
(CGL) insurance policies issued by Harleysville Group Insurance (Harleysville).  
These cases arise from separate actions, but we address them in a single opinion as 
they involve virtually identical issues regarding insurance coverage for damages 
stemming from the defective construction of two condominium complexes in 
Myrtle Beach: Magnolia North Horizontal Property Regime (Magnolia North) and 
Riverwalk at Arrowhead Country Club Horizontal Property Regime (Riverwalk).  
The Special Referee found coverage under the policies was triggered and 
calculated Harleysville's pro rata portion of the progressive damages based on its 
time on the risk. We affirm the findings of the Special Referee in the Magnolia 
North matter, and we affirm as modified in the Riverwalk matter. 
I. 
The Riverwalk and Magnolia North developments were constructed between 1997 
and 2000. After construction was complete and the units were sold, the purchasers 
became aware of significant construction problems, including building code 
violations, structural deficiencies, and significant water-intrusion problems.  In 
2003, the purchasers filed suit to recover damages for necessary repairs to their 
homes.   
The lawsuits were filed by the respective property owners' associations (the 
POAs), which sought actual and punitive damages for the extensive construction 
defects under theories of negligent construction, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
breach of warranty.1  As to the Riverwalk development, individual homeowners 
1 The Magnolia North trial involved claims of negligent construction, breach of 
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also filed a class action to recover damages for the loss of use of their property 
during the repair period.2  The defendants in the underlying suits were the related 
corporate entities that developed and constructed the condominium complexes: 
Heritage Communities, Inc. (the parent development company), Heritage Magnolia 
North, Inc. and Heritage Riverwalk, Inc. (the project-specific subsidiary companies 
for each separate development), and Buildstar Corporation (the general contracting 
subsidiary that oversaw construction of all Heritage development projects), to 
which we refer collectively as "Heritage." 
During the period of construction from 1997 to 2000, the various Heritage entities 
each maintained several liability insurance policies with Harleysville with per-
occurrence limits totaling between $3,000,000 and $4,000,000 on the primary 
policies and between $9,000,000 and $13,000,000 on the excess liability policies.3 
Heritage was uninsured after the last policy lapsed in 2001, and the financial strain 
of numerous construction-defect lawsuits caused Heritage to go out of business in 
2003.4 
implied warranty of workmanlike service, and breach of fiduciary duty for failing 
to repair or fund repairs needed in the common areas at the time the property was 
turned over to the POA.  In the Riverwalk litigation, the POA asserted similar 
claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.   
2 This class action was consolidated for trial with the Riverwalk POA suit.   
3 Between August 1997 and November 1999, Heritage Communities, Inc. 
maintained various policies with $1,000,000 in primary liability coverage and 
$4,000,000 in excess coverage. From April 1997 to August 2000, BuildStar 
Corporation maintained $1,000,000 of coverage in both primary and excess 
policies. From June 1997 to June 2001, Heritage Riverwalk, Inc. maintained 
policies of $1,000,000 in primary coverage and $4,000,000 in excess coverage. 
From September 1998 to November 2000, Heritage Magnolia North maintained 
$1,000,000 in liability coverage and $4,000,000 in excess coverage.  
4 In January 2001, Heritage Communities, Inc., the parent development company, 
filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and 
thereafter was administratively dissolved by the South Carolina Secretary of State 
in June 2011. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-14-210(d) (2006) ("A corporation 
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After receiving notice of the lawsuits, Harleysville informed its insureds that it 
would provide for their defense; however, Harleysville contends this was done 
under a full reservation of rights.  Harleysville's efforts to reserve its rights were 
generic statements of potential non-coverage coupled with furnishing most of the 
Heritage entities with copies (through a cut-and-paste method) of the insurance 
policies. There is no dispute that Harleysville would control the litigation.  
Harleysville contends that all coverage issues would be litigated following the 
entry of any adverse jury verdict.  
At the outset of each trial, Harleysville's counsel for Heritage conceded liability, 
and in both trials, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the POA on the 
negligent construction cause of action.  See Magnolia North Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. 
Heritage Cmtys., 397 S.C. 348, 369–70, 725 S.E.2d 112, 123–24 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(observing that "during opening arguments, counsel [for Heritage] conceded 
liability" and affirming the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of the 
POA); Pope v. Heritage Cmtys., 395 S.C. 404, 429–30, 717 S.E.2d 765, 778–79 
(Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Heritage's concessions of liability during opening 
statements and finding no error in the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in 
favor of the POA). Thus, the only contested issue in the underlying trials was the 
nature and extent of the damages resulting from the admitted negligent 
construction. 
In this regard, the parties presented various experts who offered widely different 
estimates of the costs to correct the construction defects.  According to the POAs' 
experts, the cost of necessary repairs totaled approximately $9,200,000 at 
Magnolia North and $8,600,000 at Riverwalk.  In contrast, defense experts testified 
the necessary repairs would cost much less—approximately $2,400,000 at 
Magnolia North and $2,500,000 at Riverwalk.  Ultimately, the juries declined to 
adopt any one expert's estimate, instead returning verdicts somewhere between the 
parties' figures. In the Magnolia North matter, the jury returned a general verdict 
for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages, and in the 
dissolved administratively continues its corporate existence but may not carry on 
any business except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and 
affairs.") The remaining corporate entities, though not officially dissolved, have 
ceased operations. 
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Riverwalk suit, the jury returned a general verdict of $4,250,000 in actual damages 
and $250,000 in punitive damages in favor of the POA and $250,000 in loss-of-use 
damages and $750,000 in punitive damages in the class action.  
Following these general jury verdicts against its insureds, Harleysville filed the 
present declaratory judgment actions to determine what portion of the judgments in 
the underlying construction-defect lawsuits would be covered under Heritage's
CGL policies. In filing these suits, Harleysville contended that, under the terms of 
the policies, it has no duty to indemnify Heritage for these judgments.  
Alternatively, if any of the damages were found to be covered, Harleysville sought 
an accounting to somehow parse the jury verdicts and determine which portion of 
the juries' general verdicts constituted covered damages.  Harleysville further 
argued it could be responsible for only that portion of damages occurring during 
the period of time its policies provided coverage.   
The matter was referred to a Special Referee, who held an evidentiary hearing in 
December 2010.  Because this Court's decision in Crossmann Communities of 
North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.5 was pending at the 
time, the parties agreed for the Special Referee to stay the matter until Crossmann
was resolved. After Crossmann was decided in August 2011, the parties agreed for 
the Special Referee to reopen the evidentiary hearing in December 2011 to hear 
arguments and testimony regarding the applicability of the time-on-the-risk 
formulation as set forth in Crossmann. The POAs objected to the admission of 
evidence regarding time on the risk, arguing that it was inappropriate to parse the 
juries' general, unallocated verdicts by evaluating Harleysville's time on the risk. 
Ultimately, the Special Referee found coverage under the policies was triggered 
because the juries' general verdicts included some covered damages.  Although the 
Special Referee found that the costs to remove and replace the faulty workmanship 
were not covered under the policies, the Special Referee concluded that it would be 
improper and purely speculative to attempt to allocate the juries' general verdicts 
between covered and non-covered damages.  Accordingly, the Special Referee 
ordered the full amount of the actual damages in the construction-defect suits 
would be subject to Harleysville's duty to indemnify in proportion with its time on 
the risk. The Special Referee made factual findings regarding the dates of the 
progressive damages period and the period during which Harleysville provided 
5 395 S.C. 40, 717 S.E.2d 589 (2011). 
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coverage. The Special Referee thereafter calculated Harleysville's pro rata portion 
of the progressive damages based on Harleysville's time on the risk.  Lastly, the 
Special Referee found punitive damages were covered and that no policy exclusion 
applied to preclude coverage for any portion of those damages. 
The parties subsequently filed cross-appeals.  Harleysville is the primary 
Appellant. Upon the parties' joint motion, these matters were certified from the 
court of appeals to this Court pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. 
II. 
"A declaratory judgment action is neither legal nor equitable, and therefore, the 
standard of review is determined by the nature of the underlying issue."  Auto 
Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 191, 684 S.E.2d 541, 543 (2009) (citing 
Colleton Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cnty., 371 S.C. 224, 231, 
638 S.E.2d 685, 688 (2006)). "When the purpose of the underlying dispute is to 
determine whether coverage exists under an insurance policy, the action is one at 
law." Id. (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hamin, 368 S.C. 536, 540, 629 S.E.2d 
683, 685 (Ct. App. 2006)). "In an action at law tried without a jury, the appellate 
court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless there is no evidence to 
reasonably support them."  Id.  Indeed, this Court's scope of review "'is limited to 
correcting errors of law.'" City of Hartsville v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin. Fund, 
382 S.C. 535, 543, 677 S.E.2d 574, 578 (2009) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. James, 337 S.C. 86, 93, 522 S.E.2d 345, 348–49 (Ct. App. 1999)).   
The threshold question in determining coverage under a CGL policy is whether the 
claim at issue is for "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" within the 
general grant of coverage in the CGL insuring agreement.  Specifically, the CGL 
policies at issue in these cases provide: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of "bodily injury" [or] "property damage" . . . 
to which this insurance applies. . . .  
a. This insurance applies only:
(1) To "bodily injury" or "property damage": 
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(a) That occurs during the policy period; and  
 
(b) That is caused by an "occurrence." 6   
 
The CGL policies define "property damage" as "physical injury to tangible 
property, including all resulting loss of use of that property," and define an 
"occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions."7  Applying these terms to 
ascertain the scope of coverage in construction-defect cases has resulted in 
considerable litigation, not just in South Carolina, but across the country.  
 
In L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 
33 (2005), this Court explored the issue in determining whether costs to repair 
negligently constructed roadways were covered under the general contractor's CGL 
policy. Id. at 122, 621 S.E.2d at 35. Observing there was no claimed damage to 
property other than to the defectively constructed roadway—in other words, the 
completed work itself—this Court held the claimed losses were not covered by the 
CGL policy. Id. at 123–24, 621 S.E.2d at 36–37.  However, in L-J, we 
foreshadowed that the coverage question would be resolved differently under 
different circumstances.  Specifically, we explained that where a claimed loss is for 
damage to property other than the faulty workmanship itself, such as where 
continuous or repeated water intrusion causes damage to otherwise non-defective 
construction components, then the claim may be covered under the terms of the 
policy, as it would not constitute a mere allegation of faulty or defective 
                                        
6 The language of the excess liability policies is similar and provides: 
 
We will pay on behalf of the insured the "ultimate net loss" in excess 
of the "applicable underlying limit" which the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of: 
 
a. "Bodily injury" or "property damage" covered by this policy 
and caused by an "occurrence" which occurs during the policy 
period . . . . 
 
7 The definitions of "property damage" and "occurrence" are identical in the 
primary and excess policies.   
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workmanship. Id. at 123–24, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country Assocs. v. 
N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474 (N.H. 1994)). 
Consistent with our projection in L-J, several years later in Auto Owners Insurance 
Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 684 S.E.2d 541 (2009), we held that a 
subcontractor's negligent application of stucco, which allowed water to seep into 
the plaintiff's home causing damage to the home's framing and exterior sheathing, 
constituted an occurrence under the builder's CGL policy.  Although the Court 
found the damages caused by the continuous moisture intrusion resulting from this 
negligent construction were covered by the CGL policy, the Court emphasized that 
the costs of removing and replacing the defective stucco itself amounted to faulty 
workmanship, which was not covered. 8 Id. at 194, 684 S.E.2d at 544–45. 
8 On March 10, 2008, this Court issued an initial decision in Newman in which we 
found all damages caused by water intrusion resulting from defectively installed 
stucco were covered under the terms of the CGL policy.  In so holding, we initially 
affirmed the trial court's finding that the cost of repairing and replacing the 
defectively installed stucco itself was included in the covered damages, as the 
underlying damage could neither be assessed nor repaired without first removing 
the exterior sheathing. Thereafter, Auto Owners filed a petition for rehearing on 
April 21, 2008; on that same day, Harleysville filed a motion with this Court 
seeking leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae in support of Auto Owners' petition 
for rehearing, which was subsequently granted.  In its Amicus brief, citing 
numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support, Harleysville urged this Court 
to grant rehearing and argued, among other things, that the Court should reverse its 
decision finding repair or replacement costs for the faulty workmanship to be 
covered under the CGL policy, even if the Court ultimately determined other 
resulting damage was covered.  Auto Owners' petition for rehearing was granted on 
August 22, 2008, and the case was reheard on November 6, 2008, prior to the 
underlying Magnolia North and Riverwalk trials.  On September 8, 2009, the Court 
refiled its decision in Newman, this time determining that the cost to remove and 
replace the defective stucco was not covered under the CGL policy; however, the 
Court concluded that because there was no evidence in the record indicating which 
portions of the arbitrator's award of damages may be attributed to the removal and 
replacement of defective stucco, the entire damages award was covered.  A key 
point here is that Harleysville's presence in, and corresponding knowledge of, the 
Newman litigation illustrates Harleysville's understanding at the time of the 
underlying Riverwalk and Magnolia North trials of the distinction between faulty 
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Two years later, in Crossmann, the Court reaffirmed the result in Newman—that 
costs to repair faulty workmanship itself are not covered under a CGL policy but 
costs to repair resulting damage to otherwise non-defective components are 
covered—while clarifying that the relevant policy term in the insuring agreement is 
"property damage," rather than "occurrence."  395 S.C. at 48–50, 717 S.E.2d. at 
593–94 (explaining the use of the phrase "physical injury" in defining property 
damage suggests that such property was "not defective at the outset, but rather was 
initially proper and injured thereafter").  We clarified that faulty workmanship was 
not covered because it did not constitute property damage—not because it did not 
meet the definition of  "occurrence." Id. (explaining the ongoing water penetration 
fell within the expanded definition of occurrence—namely, the "continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions"—and thus 
constituted the relevant occurrence).  This Court further found the scope of an 
insurer's duty to indemnify was limited to damages accrued during the insurer's 
time on the risk, overruling earlier case law that held an insurer's liability was joint 
and several. Id. at 59–64, 717 S.E.2d at 599–01. 
In so holding, the Court acknowledged that, when property damage is progressive 
(as is the case with damages resulting from water intrusion), "it is often 'both 
scientifically and administratively impossible'" to determine precisely what 
quantum of property damage occurred during each policy period. Id. at 64, 717 
S.E.2d at 601 (quoting Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 
301 (Mass. 2009)). Thus, the Court determined that where it is impracticable to 
calculate the exact measure of damages attributable to the injury that triggered 
each policy, the default rule is that an insurer's pro rata share of the damages is a 
function of the total number of years damages progressed and the portion of those 
years a particular insurer provided coverage.  Id. at 64–65, 717 S.E.2d at 602. 
Although Crossmann represented a sea change in terms of adopting the time-on-
the-risk approach (and abandoning the "joint and several" approach), Crossmann
left unchanged the basic concept, first signaled in L-J then formally adopted in 
Newman, that the cost of repairing faulty workmanship is not covered under CGL 
policies but resulting property damage beyond the defective work product itself is 
covered. With these principles in mind, we turn to the legal issues presented on 
workmanship and resulting property damage and the importance of that distinction 
for purposes of determining coverage.  
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III. 

Coverage Issues 

 
Harleysville and the POAs each contend the Special Referee made various errors 
in declaring the scope of coverage under the policies.  We disagree and address 
these claims of error below. 
 
A. Reservation of Rights to Contest Coverage 
 
Harleysville first contends the Special Referee erred in finding it failed to properly 
reserve the right to contest coverage as to the underlying damages that constitute 
faulty workmanship, which are not covered under South Carolina law.  We 
disagree. It is axiomatic that an insured must be provided sufficient information to 
understand the reasons the insurer believes the policy may not provide coverage.  
We agree with the Special Referee that generic denials of coverage coupled with 
furnishing the insured with a verbatim recitation of all or most of the policy 
provisions (through a cut-and-paste method) is not sufficient. That is precisely 
what happened here, with the exception of the coverage dispute concerning 
punitive damages. 
 
A basic understanding of reservation of rights to contest coverage may be helpful.  
"A 'unilateral reservation of rights' is a notice given by the insurer that it will 
defend [the insured in the lawsuit] but reserves all rights it has based on 
noncoverage under the policy . . . ."  14 Couch on Ins. § 202:38.  A reservation of 
rights is a way for an insurer to avoid breaching its duty to defend and seek to 
suspend operation of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel prior to a determination 
of the insured's liability.  Id.  "Although a reservation of rights may protect an 
insurer's interests, it also is intended to benefit the policyholder by alerting the 
policyholder to the potential that coverage may be inapplicable for a loss; that 
conflicts may exist as between the policyholder and the insurer; and, that the 
policyholder should take steps necessary to protect its potentially uninsured 
interests." 12 New Appleman on Insurance § 149.02[2][a].     
 
"A reservation of rights letter must give fair notice to the insured that the insurer 
intends to assert defenses to coverage or to pursue a declaratory relief action at a 
later date." United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Waterfront N.Y. Realty Corp., 948 F. Supp. 
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263, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Moreover, because an insurer typically has the right to 
control the litigation and is in the best position to see to it that the damages are 
allocated, courts have found that where an insurer defends under a reservation of 
rights, an insurer has a duty to inform the insured of the need for an allocated 
verdict as to covered versus noncovered damages.  See Tyger River Pine Co. v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933) (observing that where 
an insurer reserves the right to control the defense, the insured is "directly deprived 
of a voice or part in such negotiations and defense" and noting that if an insurer's 
interests conflict with those of its insured, the insurer is " bound, under its contract 
of indemnity, and in good faith, to sacrifice its interests in favor of those of the 
[insured]"); see also Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 819 
N.W.2d 602, 618 (Minn. 2012) (holding that "when an insurer notifies its insured
that it accepts the defense of a[] [] claim under a reservation of rights that includes 
covered and noncovered claims, the insurer not only has a duty to defend the 
claim, but also to disclose to its insured the insured's interest in obtaining a written 
explanation of the award that identifies the claims or theories of recovery actually 
proved and the portions of the award attributable to each"); id. (reasoning that the 
"insurer is in a unique position to know the scope of coverage and exclusions in its 
policies" and "the duty to notify [the insured] is not onerous").
"The right to control the litigation carries with it certain duties," including "the 
duty not to prejudice the insured's rights by failing to request special 
interrogatories or a special verdict in order to clarify coverage of damages."  
Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1498 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(citations omitted) (explaining "[i]f the burden of apportioning damages between 
covered and non-covered were to rest on the insured, who is not in control of the 
defense, the insurer could obtain for itself an escape from responsibility merely by 
failing to request a special verdict or special interrogatories" (citing Duke v. Hoch,
468 F.2d 973, 979 (5th Cir. 1972))).  Therefore, by "virtue of its duty to defend, an 
insurer gains the advantage of exclusive control over the litigation," and "it would 
be unreasonable to permit the insurer to not disclose potential bases for denying 
coverage." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
"If the insured does not know the grounds on which the insurer may contest 
coverage, the insured is placed at a disadvantage because it loses the opportunity to 
investigate and prepare a defense on its own."  Desert Ridge Resort LLC v. 
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., 141 F. Supp. 3d 962, 967 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
Indeed without knowledge of the bases upon which the insurer might dispute 
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coverage, "the insured has no reason to act to protect its rights because it is 
unaware that a conflict of interest exists between itself and the insurer."  Magnum 
Foods, 36 F.3d at 1498 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Thus, 
"[t]he general rule precluding an insurer from raising new grounds contesting 
coverage in a subsequent action is justified in th[is] []context."  Id. 
Where the insurer fails to adequately reserve the right to contest coverage, the 
insurer may be precluded from doing so. See World Harvest Church, Inc. v. 
GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., 695 S.E.2d 6, 10–11 (Ga. 2010) (finding an insurer could 
not assert a defense of noncoverage based on its failure to effectively reserve the 
right to contest coverage).  "For a reservation of rights to be effective, the 
reservation must be unambiguous; if it is ambiguous, the purported reservation of 
rights must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the 
insured." Id. at 10. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Desert 
Ridge Resort, 141 F. Supp. 3d. 966–68 (explaining that where an insurer 
undertakes and exclusively controls the defense of the insured under a reservation 
of rights, prior to undertaking the defense, the insurer must specify in detail any 
and all bases upon which it might contest coverage in the future since "[g]rounds 
not identified in the reservation of rights may not be asserted later by the insurer"); 
id. (explaining the existence of a potential conflict of interest between insured and 
insurer is what requires the insured to set forth the bases upon which it might 
contend damages are not covered in a greater amount of detail than would 
otherwise be required); Weber v. Biddle, 483 P.2d 155, 159 (Wash. Ct.App. 1971) 
(underscoring that when an insurer controls the defense of the action against its 
insured, "a high fiduciary duty [i]s owed by the insurer to the insured" and 
observing a "general notice of reservation of rights failing to refer specifically to 
the policy provision upon which the insurer wished to rely may be insufficient").   
At the hearing before the Special Referee, Harleysville produced letters it sent to 
former Heritage principals and counsel between December 2003 and February 
2004.9  These letters explained that Harleysville would provide a defense in the 
9 The Magnolia North lawsuit was filed on May 28, 2003, but it was not until more 
than six months later that Harleysville sent "reservation of right" letters—one to 
Heritage Communities, Inc. on December 11, 2003, and another to Heritage 
Magnolia North, Inc. on December 12, 2003.  As none of the parties take issue 
with this delay, we do not address the timeliness of Harleysville's letters.   
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underlying suits and listed the name and contact information for the defense 
attorney Harleysville had selected to represent Heritage in each matter.  These 
letters identify the particular insured entity and lawsuit at issue, summarize the 
allegations in the complaint, and identify the policy numbers and policy periods for 
policies that potentially provided coverage.10  Additionally, each of these letters 
(through a cut-and-paste approach) incorporated a nine- or ten-page excerpt of 
various policy terms, including the provisions relating to the insuring agreement, 
Harleysville's duty to defend, and numerous policy exclusions and definitions.  
Despite these policy references, the letters included no discussion of Harleysville's
position as to the various provisions or explanation of its reasons for relying 
thereon. With the exception of the claim for punitive damages, the letters failed to 
specify the particular grounds upon which Harleysville did, or might thereafter, 
dispute coverage. 
In contrast, concerning punitive damages, Harleysville did provide in detail the 
basis for the potential denial of coverage: 
The complaint filed against you seeks punitive damages. 
[Harleysville] reserves the right to disclaim coverage for these since 
under all of your policies, they would not arise from an "occurrence," 
do not fit the definition of "bodily injury" or "property damage," 
and/or were "expected and intended" within the meaning of exclusions 
in the policies. 
These letters further advised Heritage of the possibility it may face an uninsured 
exposure or interest to the extent that any damages ultimately awarded exceeded 
the policy limits.  Harleysville therefore recommended that Heritage and its 
principals consider employing personal counsel to represent any uninsured 
exposure or interest, despite the Heritage entities having long been defunct at the 
time of the construction-defect trials.  Importantly, however, none of the 
10 Notwithstanding the production of various letters at the hearing, Harleysville 
conceded it could not find a reservation of rights letter addressed to Buildstar 
specifically regarding the Magnolia North litigation or any letter regarding the 
individual homeowners' class action; however, Harleysville's construction-defect 
litigation manager, Lee Wright, testified that such letters were sent by other 
Harleysville officials and explained that Harleysville was unable to produce those 
documents at trial because its copies had been misplaced.   
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reservation letters advised Heritage of the need for allocation of damages between 
covered and non-covered losses or referenced a possible conflict of interest or 
Harleysville's intent to pursue a declaratory judgment action following any adverse 
jury verdicts in the underlying lawsuits.   
The Special Referee thoroughly analyzed these letters to determine whether 
Harleysville properly reserved its rights.  As to the substance of Harleysville's
letters to Heritage, the Special Referee found the letters were not sufficiently 
specific to put Heritage on notice of Harleysville's specific defenses, particularly as 
to the need for an allocated verdict. 
Perhaps in recognition of the inadequacy of the letters, Harleysville additionally 
relied on an oral reservation of rights based on conversations with representatives 
of Heritage. The Special Referee considered this argument (and the evidence 
advanced by Harleysville) and concluded that even if an oral reservation is
permitted in South Carolina, the oral reservations Harleysville claimed to have 
communicated to the principals of the defunct Heritage entities "fall short of the 
specificity [required] and are ambiguous at best," noting "[p]roviding timely and 
specific policy defenses and disclosing actual or potential conflicts are important 
fiduciary duties of the insurer[,] especially when, as here, Harleysville is 
controlling the defense of its insured."  The Special Referee concluded that 
Harleysville failed to properly reserve its rights to dispute coverage as to actual 
damages and, thus, Harleysville was precluded from attempting to do so in this 
action. 
Here, except as to punitive damages, Harleysville's reservation letters gave no 
express reservation or other indication that it disputed coverage for any specific 
portion or type of damages.  Nor did the letters or testimony indicate that, in the 
event Heritage was found liable in the construction-defect suits, Harleysville 
intended to file the instant lawsuit to contest various coverage issues.  Specifically, 
Harleysville did not expressly put its insureds on notice that it intended to litigate 
the issues of whether any damages resulted from acts meeting the definition of 
occurrence, whether any damages occurred during the applicable policy periods, 
what damages were attributable to non-covered faulty workmanship, and whether 
certain damages resulted from intentional acts by the insured and were thus 
excluded. And in no way did the letters inform the insureds that a conflict of 
interest may have existed or that they should protect their interests by requesting an 
appropriate verdict. As the Fifth Circuit found in Duke v. Hoch, Harleysville's 
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reservation "was no more than a general warning" and "too imprecise to shield [the 
insurer]."  468 F.2d 973, 979 (5th Cir. 1972).  We find there is evidence in the 
record to support the Special Referee's finding that Harleysville's reservation letters 
were insufficient to reserve its right to contest coverage of actual damages,11 and 
therefore, we affirm.12  Because we find Harleysville did not effectively reserve the 
11 Moreover, even were we to conclude there was no evidence to sustain this 
finding, the ultimate disposition of the coverage question would nevertheless 
remain unchanged.  In addition to finding Harleysville's attempted reservation of 
rights to be insufficient, the Special Referee also found "the Court has no basis 
upon which to make a logical assessment of the jury's purpose when it awarded the 
general verdict" as to the negligent construction, breach of warranty, and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims, and the Special Referee refused to "engage in unguided 
speculation with respect to this issue of [allocating losses], particularly when the 
dilemma now confronting Harleysville is of its own making."  Indeed, Harleysville 
cannot overcome the law in South Carolina concerning general verdicts.  See
Owners Ins. Co. v. Clayton, 364 S.C. 555, 561–62, 614 S.E.2d 611, 614–15 (2005) 
(affirming trial court's holding in a declaratory judgment action that insurer had a 
duty under the CGL policy to indemnify insured for the entire general verdict 
where at least one of several claims was covered and explaining that when a jury 
returns a general verdict, a finding of coverage as to any of the claims submitted to 
that jury "answers the coverage question" as to the entire general verdict); see also
Newman, 385 S.C. at 198, 684 S.E.2d at 547 (finding that even though arbitrator's 
award improperly included amounts for replacing and repairing faulty 
workmanship itself, there was insufficient evidence in the record to allow the Court 
to determine which costs were solely attributable to the non-covered faulty 
workmanship and finding that the insurer's duty to indemnify therefore covered the 
entire award). The dissent ignores the Special Referee's finding in this regard, 
which serves as an alternative and independent basis upon which we affirm. 
12 The dissent also suggests that the timing of this Court's decision in Newman
somehow precludes Harleysville from having set forth in its reservation of rights 
letters the faulty workmanship versus covered damages distinction upon which it 
now seeks to parse the general jury verdict.  As noted, any claim that Harleysville 
was not aware of this very distinction borders on frivolity because Harleysville 
appeared in other earlier cases (e.g., Newman) for the express purpose of urging 
the very distinction it now asserts.  Moreover, as early as December 2004, 
Harleysville had formally taken the position that faulty workmanship was not 
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right to contest coverage, we need not address Harleysville's claims of error 
regarding various policy exclusions.  We turn now to the issue of punitive
damages, the coverage of which Harleysville effectively reserved the right to 
contest. 
B. Punitive Damages—Insuring Agreement
Harleysville argues it has no duty to indemnify Heritage for punitive damages, 
which it contends are not covered under the insuring agreement in the first 
instance. Specifically, Harleysville contends that by awarding punitive damages, 
the jury necessarily found that Heritage's wrongdoing and the results therefrom
were not accidental, which is required for losses to amount to an occurrence.  We
disagree. 
covered in a dispute with a different insured in a South Carolina federal court.  
Specifically, Harleysville filed a complaint seeking a declaration that it had no duty 
to defend its insured, a Beaufort County homebuilder and general contractor, in 
thirteen state-court actions, and arguing the damages at issue in those lawsuits 
arose from the insured's faulty workmanship and, thus, were not covered under the 
CGL policy. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Bldg. Corp., 66 Fed. R. 
Serv.3d 811 (D.S.C. 2006) (quoting Harleysville's description of the coverage 
questions presented as "'whether the claims arise from an "occurrence"; whether 
they constitute "property damage"; and whether the claims allege only damage to 
property arising from a defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in 
[the insured's] work'").  Moreover, Harleysville further asserted that "'the law of 
South Carolina is settled: there is no insurance coverage for construction defects.'"
Id. (quoting Harleysville's pleadings).  Thus, regardless of any decisions by this 
Court in the interim, the position taken by Harleysville—that faulty workmanship 
is not covered under the insuring agreement— has been consistent since 2004, and 
Harleysville demonstrated that it understood how to articulate its position in detail; 
it simply failed to do so in the cases presently before the Court.  Moreover, the 
relevant language in Harleysville's policies has, at all times, remained unchanged, 
as has South Carolina's common law regarding conflicts of interest and the high 
standards of conduct an insurer owes to its insureds. See Sims v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 82, 145 S.E.2d 523 (1965); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland 
Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).  Thus, the suggestion in the dissent 
that Harleysville is being held to a standard of clairvoyance must be rejected.    
37 

  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
The insuring language in the CGL policies provides Harleysville will indemnify 
Heritage for "those sums" Heritage becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
arising from an occurrence.  The policies include the standard CGL definition of an 
"occurrence" as an "accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions."     
In arguing punitive damages are not "accidental" and therefore not an occurrence, 
Harleysville ignores that the progressive water intrusion constitutes the relevant 
occurrence. Further, Harleysville disregards not only the progressive-damage 
aspect of the occurrence definition (i.e., "continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions") but also this Court's holding in
Crossmann that the insuring language of a CGL policy is triggered by progressive 
damages caused by repeated water intrusion.  Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 
S.E.2d at 593. Thus, Harleysville is contractually obligated to indemnify Heritage
for those sums Heritage becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of that 
progressive water intrusion, and the policy does not limit "those sums" to 
compensatory or actual damages.
Properly looking to the terms of the applicable policies, the Special Referee found 
that if Harleysville intended to preclude coverage for punitive damages, it could 
simply have added the word "compensatory" before the word "damages" in the 
policies' insuring language.  Because the policies' language did not unambiguously
exclude punitive damages, the Special Referee applied well-established law and 
construed the policy language in favor of the insured, finding Harleysville was 
required to indemnify Heritage for punitive damages.  
"[A]mbiguities in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured."  
Whitlock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 399 S.C. 610, 615–16, 732 S.E.2d 626, 628 
(2012). Moreover, this Court has previously found punitive damages are covered 
as they constituted a sum the insured was "legally obligated to pay as damages."  
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 204, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965); see S.C. 
State Budget & Control Bd. v. Prince, 304 S.C. 241, 249, 403 S.E.2d 643, 648 
(1991) ("Here, as in Carroway, the policy does not limit recovery to actual 
damages.  Instead, the policy uses broader language which, under the rules of 
construction and interpretation of insurance policies, must be read as encompassing 
punitive damages.").  Because the policy does not unambiguously exclude punitive 
damages, we construe the policy language in favor of the insured to include 
punitive damages, and we therefore affirm the Special Referee's finding that 
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punitive damages are covered.  See, e.g., Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 
593–94 (noting that an ambiguity in a CGL policy must be construed in favor of 
the insured). 
C. Punitive Damages—"Expected or Intended" Exclusion
Harleysville next argues the Special Referee erred in failing to find punitive 
damages fall within the policy exclusion barring coverage for acts that are
"expected or intended."  Harleysville contends that by awarding punitive damages, 
the jury necessarily found that Heritage's wrongdoing was a "conscious failure" 
and involved a "present consciousness of wrongdoing," and thus, Heritage's 
wrongdoing and the results thereof were intended or at least expected damages, 
which would be excluded under the policy.13  We disagree. 
An insurance company bears the burden of establishing the applicability of policy 
exclusions. Owners Ins. Co. v. Clayton, 364 S.C. 555, 560, 614 S.E.2d 611, 614 
(2005) (citing Boggs v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252 S.E.2d 565 
(1979)). For an act to be excluded from coverage under the policy exclusion for 
losses "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured," this Court has 
held that "not only the act causing the loss must have been intentional but [] the 
results of the act must also have been intended."  Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Ins. 
Co., 268 S.C. 72, 75, 231 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1977) (explaining the insured must be 
shown to have acted intentionally and to have intended the specific type of loss or 
injury that resulted for the exclusion to apply).  These questions of the insured's 
intent are factual in nature.  Id. "In an action at law tried without a jury, the 
appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless there is no 
evidence to reasonably support them."  Newman, 385 S.C. at 191, 684 S.E.2d at 
543 (citing Hamin, 368 S.C at 540, 629 S.E.2d at 685).   
The Special Referee found Heritage intended to construct quality condominiums 
and that Harleysville failed to meet its burden of proving Heritage expected or 
intended its subcontractors to perform negligently or expected or intended the 
property damage that resulted from the negligent construction. In so finding, the 
Special Referee relied upon evidence that Heritage expected its subcontractors to 
13 On each jury verdict form, the jury answered "Yes" to the question, "Does the 
Jury find by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants' actions were 
willful, wanton, reckless, and/or grossly negligent?" 
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be reliable and skilled, that Heritage was actively addressing construction and 
water-intrusion concerns to determine the source of the problems, and that post-
construction testing revealed a portion of the water intrusion was the result of 
defectively manufactured components rather than improper installation.  In this 
regard, the Special Referee relied upon Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmer's 
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957), a Fourth 
Circuit decision applying South Carolina law, in finding that an insured's negligent 
conduct may be so gross as to form a basis for punitive damages yet not rise to the 
level of an intentional act such that it would come within the ambit of the 
expected-or-intended policy exclusion.  Ultimately, the Special Referee concluded 
there was nothing in the record demonstrating Heritage intended to injure the 
POAs or homeowners and, thus, punitive damages were not excluded from
coverage. 
Although Harleysville produced some testimony suggesting Heritage was aware of 
certain instances of post-construction water intrusion around various windows, 
there is other evidence that suggests Heritage was attempting to find the source of 
the leaks and stop them.  We recognize the counter-argument propounded by 
Harleysville that Heritage approached the construction of these condominium
projects with the aim of doing as little as possible.  The evidence of shoddy 
workmanship would tend to support the argument that Heritage had knowledge 
that the projects were substandard.  But our standard of review as to this factual 
issue of intent is not de novo. Because there is evidence in the record to support 
the Special Referee's findings, we are constrained by the standard of review to 
affirm the finding that Harleysville failed to meet its burden of showing the 
expected-or-intended policy exclusion operates to exclude punitive damages from
coverage. See S.C. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 
623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 303 (2001) (observing that the determination of a party's
intent is a question of fact); State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 
608 (1971) (explaining that the issue of intent is a question for the factfinder); see 
also Miller, 268 S.C. at 75, 231 S.E.2d at 702 (noting that an insurer must 
demonstrate not only that the insured acted intentionally but also that the insured 
intended the specific type of loss or injury that resulted for the damages to be 
excluded from coverage as "expected or intended" losses); Townes Assocs. v. City 
of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 776 (1976) (explaining that in an 
action at law tried without a jury, an appellate court reviews the evidence, "not to 
determine the preponderance thereof but to determine whether there is any
evidence which reasonably supports the factual findings of the judge"). 
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IV. 

Allocation Issues: Time on the Risk 

Both Harleysville and the POAs contend the Special Referee made various errors 
in allocating damages based on the time-on-the-risk formula set forth in 
Crossmann. For the reasons below, we affirm the Special Referee's time-on-the 
risk computation as to Magnolia North and affirm as slightly modified as to the 
loss-of-use damages in the Riverwalk litigation.  
In December 2011, the Special Referee reopened the evidentiary hearing to allow 
the parties to present arguments and evidence regarding the application of 
Crossmann's time-on-the-risk formula.  During the hearing, the parties presented 
evidence that following construction, the last certificate of occupancy was issued 
in January 2000 at Riverwalk and August 2000 at Magnolia North.  The evidence 
also revealed that Heritage maintained insurance coverage through June 2001 at 
Riverwalk and November 2000 at Magnolia North. 
Additionally, the POAs offered the testimony of Drew Brown, an expert in 
building diagnostics and general contracting, who testified that the water intrusion 
damage at the Riverwalk and Magnolia North developments began at the time of 
the first rain event following improper installation of the building components.  In 
terms of the progressive nature of the damages, Brown further explained: 
[D]amage and decay are two different things.  Damage begins with 
the water entering the sensitive, the moisture[-]sensitive building 
products, and that's the standard of the [building] code.  The 
[building] code indicates that we must protect these building 
components from damage, from water intrusion, which then will— 
that water intrusion begins, the wood products begin to uptake that 
water, that damage cycle has begun.  Eventually, decay will begin, 
which is a microbial process that will, will actually begin to destroy 
the ability of the wood to carry any load . . . .   
Brown testified that by the time he conducted site visits between December 2003 
and April 2004, many of the building components at the developments were 
damaged to the point they required replacement and that subsequent decay 
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eventually caused structural failure and collapse at both developments.14 
In conducting the time-on-the-risk analysis, the Special Referee, mindful of the 
general jury verdicts, specifically declined to conduct a per-building calculation 
because the jury verdicts were not rendered on a per-building basis.  The Special 
Referee concluded that the most equitable way to proceed in these specific cases 
would be to compare the total number of days in the damage period to the total 
number of days of coverage under the Harleysville policies.
In determining the proper progressive-damages period, the Special Referee found 
the damages began thirty days after the first certificate of occupancy was issued at 
each development.  As to the progressive-damages period end date, the Special 
Referee used the date of Brown's last site visit prior to the underlying trials as the 
damages cut-off point, reasoning that by that date, the building components 
identified in Brown's report were sufficiently damaged to require replacement, 
notwithstanding any further progression and decay.  Using those dates, the Special 
Referee determined that damages progressed for a period of 2,347 days at 
Riverwalk and 1,943 days at Magnolia North.  The Special Referee further 
determined that Harleysville provided coverage for 1,300 days in the Riverwalk 
matter and 691 days in the Magnolia North matter.  The Special Referee used those 
figures to calculate a time-on-the-risk multiplier for each development, which he 
then applied to calculate Harleysville's pro rata portion of the progressive damages.   
On appeal, both parties take issue with the dates the Special Referee used in his 
calculations, and Harleysville contends the Special Referee erred in failing to 
14 At the hearing, Harleysville proffered the testimony of a general-contracting 
construction expert, who conducted site visits to survey the construction 
deficiencies and prepared a report to estimate the percentage of damage 
attributable to faulty workmanship at each development.  Although this evidence 
was ultimately excluded because the site visits and subsequent reports long post-
dated the jury verdicts and did not correspond with the evidence of damages 
presented to the juries, we emphasize that even Harleysville's own expert testified 
it was impossible to determine when the damage began or ended at either 
development. Thus, even had the Special Referee admitted this evidence, it 
nevertheless would not support the point Harleysville now urges—namely, that the 
progression of damages was reasonably ascertainable. 
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conduct a per-building analysis and in refusing to include loss-of-use and punitive 
damages in the figure to be reduced by the time-on-the-risk multiplier.  
Additionally, the POAs contend application of the time-on-the-risk formula at all is 
inappropriate because the jury rendered general verdicts, and therefore Harleysville 
should be required to indemnify Heritage for the entire amount of all jury 
verdicts—not a reduced amount proportionate to Harleysville's time on the risk.   
A. Loss of Use—Actual Damages 
Harleysville contends the actual damages awarded for loss of use in the Riverwalk
class action should be deemed to be progressive in nature and, thus, included in the 
amount subject to allocation based on Harleysville's time on the risk.  We agree 
and modify the Special Referee's Riverwalk calculation slightly to include 
allocation of the actual damages resulting from loss of use. 
"An insurance policy is a contract . . . and the terms of the policy are to be 
construed according to contract law."  Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Rollison, 378 S.C. 
600, 606, 663 S.E.2d 484, 487 (2008) (citing Estate of Revis v. Revis, 326 S.C. 
470, 477, 484 S.E.2d 112, 116 (Ct. App. 1997)).  "Where [a] contract's language is 
clear and unambiguous, the language alone determines the contract's force and 
effect." McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009) (citing 
Schulmeyer v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 353 S.C. 491, 495, 579 S.E.2d 132, 
134 (2003)). "It is a question of law for the court whether the language of a 
contract is ambiguous."  Id. (citing Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. at 623, 550 
S.E.2d at 302–03).
The policies provide "'[p]roperty damage' that is loss of use of tangible property 
that is not physically injured will be deemed to occur at the time of the 'occurrence' 
that caused it."15  In this case, the relevant occurrence is the repeated infiltration of 
water into the improperly constructed buildings, which is a progressive injury.  See 
Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 52 n.8, 717 S.E.2d at 595 n.8 (explaining a progressive 
injury "results from an event or set of conditions that occurs repeatedly or 
continuously over time, such as . . . the continual intrusion of water into a 
building").  Because the underlying occurrence is progressive in nature, we find the 
15 The excess liability policies contain a similar provision: "All such loss of use 
shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 'occurrence' that caused it." 
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language of the policies unambiguously provides that loss-of-use damages must be 
deemed to have progressed over the same period of time.  Accordingly, we modify 
the Special Referee's time-on-the risk calculation for Riverwalk as follows: 
 
Riverwalk   
Actual damages—POA $4,250,000 
Actual damages—Class Action $250,000 
Setoff16  ($1,028,821) 
Adjusted actual damages $3,471,179 
Time-on-the-risk multiplier 0.5538 
Harleysville's pro rata share of actual $1,922,338 
damages 
Punitive damages—POA $250,000 
Punitive damages—Class Action $750,000 
Total amount covered by Harleysville's $2,922,338 
policies 
 
In sum, we affirm the findings of the Special Referee as modified above, and find 
the policies covered $2,922,338 as to the Riverwalk litigation. 
 
B. Punitive Damages 
 
Turning to the issue of punitive damages, Harleysville argues that punitive 
damages, like actual damages, are subject to allocation based on time on the risk.  
Without establishing a categorical rule, we disagree with Harleysville in these 
circumstances and affirm.    
 
In the construction-defect trials, the POAs presented evidence that during the 
construction process at both Riverwalk and Magnolia North (as well as several of 
Heritage's other large-scale condominium developments in Horry County), 
Heritage chose not to employ an inspecting architect to evaluate and approve or 
disapprove any modifications and substitutions to the original construction plans 
and specifications. The POAs contended the absence of an inspecting architect 
16 By way of post-trial motion in the underlying construction-defect suit, 
Harleysville was granted a setoff as a result of settlement amounts paid by 
defendants other than Heritage. 
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resulted in the widespread and unchecked substitution of inferior building products 
and improper structural modifications that ultimately led to the pervasive structural 
and water-intrusion problems, all of which could have been avoided had the 
original specifications been followed or properly modified.  Further, the POAs 
argued that although Heritage was aware of significant water-intrusion problems at 
the other developments before beginning construction at Riverwalk and Magnolia 
North, Heritage nevertheless continued the same inadequate construction practices 
at these developments.  The POAs presented additional evidence that despite 
knowledge of the ongoing construction problems, Heritage also deliberately 
targeted its sales efforts toward elderly, out-of-state residents and marketed its 
condominiums on the basis of quality and luxurious amenities, such as swimming 
pools and tennis courts, that were never constructed.  The POAs contended that all 
of this evidence demonstrated Heritage willfully and repeatedly sold improperly 
constructed condominiums to innocent purchasers and that such conduct justified 
the imposition of punitive damages.  As noted, the jury verdicts included punitive-
damage awards of $2,000,000 in the Magnolia North suit, $250,000 in the 
Riverwalk POA suit, and $750,000 in the Riverwalk class action.
Although the Special Referee determined the time-on-the-risk principles set forth 
in Crossmann were applicable to the actual damages awarded by the juries, the 
Special Referee rejected Harleysville's argument that punitive damages were 
likewise subject to time-on-the-risk allocation, observing that the formula set forth 
in Crossmann referred only to damages that were deemed to be progressive.  
On appeal, Harleysville argues that punitive damages are necessarily predicated 
upon the underlying progressive damages and, therefore, are also subject to time-
on-the-risk allocation. Harleysville further avers that, like actual damages, 
punitive damages also serve a compensatory role, and since the pattern of 
reprehensible conduct justifying the imposition of punitive damages took place 
over a period of several years, "basic principles of fairness" require that 
Harleysville not be saddled with the entire punitive damages award.    
Initially, we find Harleysville seeks to blur the distinction between actual and 
punitive damages and conflates the underlying purposes of these two different 
types of damages. "The purpose of actual or compensatory damages is to 
compensate a party for injuries suffered or losses sustained." Clark v. Cantrell, 
339 S.C. 369, 378, 529 S.E.2d 528, 533 (2000) (emphasis added) (examining the 
fundamental differences between actual damages and punitive damages and 
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rejecting the argument that punitive damages should be reduced by the proportion 
of the plaintiff's comparative negligence).  "The goal [of compensatory damages] is
to restore the injured party, as nearly as possible through the payment of money, to 
the same position he or she was in before the wrongful injury occurred."  Id. 
(citations omitted).   
In contrast, punitive damages relate not to the plaintiff, but rather to the "the 
defendant's reckless, willful, wanton, or malicious conduct." Id. at 379, 529 S.E.2d 
at 533 (emphasis added); see also Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 570, 584, 
686 S.E.2d 176, 183 (2009) (observing that an award of punitive damages 
"'further[s] a state's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and 
deterring its repetition'" (emphasis added) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996))); Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 7 (1784) 
(focusing on the conduct of the defendant in affirming an award of "very 
exemplary damages" and finding such damages were warranted where the 
defendant's conduct was found to be "very wanton," particularly in light of the 
defendant's special training and experience).  "Although compensatory damages 
and punitive damages are typically awarded at the same time by the same 
decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes." Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman 
Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). "The former are intended to redress the 
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful 
conduct." Id. (citations omitted).  "The latter . . . operate as 'private fines' intended 
to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing."  Id. 
Although this Court has acknowledged punitive damages may also "compensate
. . . for the willfulness with which the [plaintiff's] right was invaded," this Court 
has unequivocally rejected the attempt to "blur all distinctions between actual and 
punitive damages by unduly emphasizing [any] compensatory aspect."  Clark, 339
S.C. at 379, 529 S.E.2d at 533 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Indeed, "'[i]t is a well-established principle of the common law, that . . . a jury may 
inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a 
defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of 
compensation to the plaintiff.'" Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15– 
16 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852)); 
see also id. at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Unlike compensatory damages, 
which serve to allocate an existing loss between two parties, punitive damages are 
specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of actual harm to make clear 
that the defendant's misconduct was especially reprehensible.").  We therefore 
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reject Harleysville's attempt to mischaracterize the punitive damages in these cases
as compensatory.   
We turn now to the question of whether punitive damages, though not 
compensatory in nature, are nevertheless subject to time-on-the-risk allocation.  
The concept of time on the risk is a judicially created, equitable method of 
allocating progressive damages "where it is impossible to know the exact measure 
of damages attributable to the injury that triggered each policy," as is the case here.  
Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 64, 717 S.E.2d at 602; see id. at 64–67, 717 S.E.2d at 601– 
03 (explaining that the time-on-the-risk method is the "equitable approach [that] 
best harmonizes" the language of CGL policies with the scientific and 
administrative impossibility of identifying the precise quantum of property damage 
occurring during each policy period).  Ultimately, this method of allocation 
"addresses a problem of proof" in cases involving progressive property damages 
"where it is not feasible to make a fact-based allocation of losses attributable to 
each policy period." Boston Gas Co., 910 N.E.2d at 316. At the heart of the time-
on-the-risk theory is the idea that the policy period is a temporal limitation upon an 
insurer's indemnity obligation.  See Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 60, 717 S.E.2d at 599 
(rejecting the "joint and several" allocation approach because, inter alia, that 
approach ignores "critical language" limiting the insurer's indemnity obligation to 
those losses occurring during the policy period).  As we explained in Crossmann, 
the time-on-the-risk allocation is a determination of "how much coverage [is to] be 
provided by each triggered policy."  Id. at 59, 717 S.E.2d at 599.  In other words, 
the analysis begins with a determination of when coverage-triggering losses 
occurred, then allocates losses based on the period of time each insurer was on the 
risk. 
A key point to the time-on-the-risk analysis is that this allocation method was 
developed as a means of apportioning actual, compensatory damages where the 
injury progressed over time.  See Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 45, 717 S.E.2d at 591 
("Where proof of the actual property damage distribution is not available, the 
allocation formula adopted herein will serve as an appropriate default method for 
dividing the loss . . . ." (emphasis added)).  As such, the logic and policy 
considerations underlying the time-on-the-risk method may not as easily lend 
themselves to the application of this concept to punitive damages.  Nevertheless, 
the parties have presented this Court (and the Special Referee) with a paucity of 
legal authority to inform our decision as to the allocability of punitive damages, 
thus forcing us to resort to these policy considerations as our guide in navigating 
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this novel issue. We emphasize it is not our intent to create a bright-line rule that 
punitive damages may never be subject to allocation based on time on the risk.  
However, we conclude the punitive-damage awards are not subject to reduction 
under the facts of these cases. 
Specifically, the difficulty here is that Harleysville does not contend, and has 
presented no evidence, that any of the reprehensible acts upon which punitive 
damages are predicated occurred outside the relevant policy periods.  To the 
contrary, the evidence in the record demonstrates that all of Heritage's
reprehensible acts that justified the juries' imposition of punitive damages took 
place entirely during the period of time Harleysville's policies were effective.  
Thus, we conclude the Special Referee did not err in finding punitive damages 
were not subject to reduction based on the time-on-the-risk multiplier in these 
cases.  
C. Time-on-the-Risk Allocation of the General Verdict 
We next turn to the POAs' contention that it was error to apply the time-on-the-risk 
allocation to the general verdicts based on the possibility that some portion of the 
jury awards might include losses which are attributable to non-progressive 
damages stemming from the POAs' breach of fiduciary duty or breach of warranty 
claims.  We affirm. 
In rejecting this argument, the Special Referee determined that both covered and 
non-covered (faulty workmanship) claims were submitted to the jury and 
concluded that it would be too speculative and inappropriate to allocate the jury 
verdicts between progressive damages subject to time-on-the-risk allocation and 
fixed losses not subject to time-on-the-risk allocation.  Thus, the Special Referee 
concluded the entire amount of actual damages would be reduced in proportion to 
Harleysville's time on the risk.   
Essentially, the POAs attempt to use the general verdict rule as both a shield and a 
sword, arguing first that the general verdict rule shields any evaluation of covered 
versus non-covered damages, yet thereafter arguing application of time-on-the-risk 
principles is wholly precluded by the possibility that some portion of the jury 
verdicts might be attributable to non-progressive damages.  We find the Special 
Referee properly rejected this argument; the general verdict rule may not serve as a 
basis for the POAs to obtain coverage for non-covered claims and simultaneously 
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serve as a basis to avoid time-on-the-risk apportionment of any aspect of the jury 
verdicts. See Mitchell v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank, 165 S.C. 457, 164 S.E. 
136, 140 (1932) (noting a party may not use the same argument as both a shield 
and a sword) (citations omitted). 
D. Factual Determinations 
Lastly, we do not believe the Special Referee abused his discretion in refusing to 
conduct a per-building analysis or in setting the policy period or progressive-
damages period dates, as there is evidence in the record to support those findings.  
See Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 65–66, 717 S.E.2d at 602 (finding it is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court to determine, in light of the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case, the most appropriate manner for applying the basic 
time-on-the-risk formula to reasonably approximate each insurer's time on the 
risk); Newman, 385 S.C. at 191, 684 S.E.2d at 543 ("In an action at law tried 
without a jury, the appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact 
unless there is no evidence to reasonably support them."); BB & T v. Taylor, 369 
S.C. 548, 551, 633 S.E.2d 501, 502–03 (2006) (explaining that when a 
determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, the standard of 
review on appeal is limited to determining whether there was an abuse of 
discretion); see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 
740, 756–57 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to disturb the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in apportioning progressive damages).  
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Special Referee's time-on-the-risk 
calculation as to Magnolia North and affirm as slightly modified as to Riverwalk.  
V. 

Miscellaneous Trial Issues 

Harleysville argues the Special Referee erred in excluding certain evidence and in 
making various factual findings. After a full review of the record, we find the 
Special Referee did not abuse his discretion and affirm pursuant to Rule 220, 
SCACR. See Am. Fed. Bank, FSB v. No. One Main Joint Venture, 321 S.C. 169, 
174–75, 467 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1996) ("Conduct of a trial, including admission and 
rejection of testimony, is largely within the trial judge's sound discretion, the 
exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal unless appellant can show abuse 
of such discretion, commission of legal error in its exercise, and resulting prejudice 
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to appellant's rights." (citing Fetner v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 199 S.C. 79, 18 S.E.2d 
521 (1942))).
Additionally, Harleysville contends it was error for the Special Referee not to 
construe its motion for judgment as a matter of law as being made pursuant to Rule 
41(b), SCRCP. Rule 41(b), SCRCP, provides that, in a non-jury action, after the 
plaintiff "has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant . . . may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief."  (emphasis added).  Here, Harleysville was the plaintiff— 
not the defendant. Moreover, Harleysville in no way sought a ruling that it, as "the 
plaintiff[,] has shown no right to relief."  Indeed, Harleysville's motion sought a 
ruling to the contrary, namely that Harleysville was entitled to relief as a matter of 
law. Thus, we find the argument that the Special Referee erred in failing to 
construe Harleysville's motion as one made pursuant to Rule 41(b), SCRCP, is 
without merit. Cf. Waterpointe I Prop. Owner's Ass'n v. Paragon, Inc., 342 S.C. 
454, 458, 536 S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App. 2000) (construing defendant's "directed 
verdict" motion in a non-jury action as a motion for involuntary non-suit under 
Rule 41(b), SCRCP, and reviewing it as such).  In any event, there can be no 
prejudicial error here, for it is manifest the Special Referee rejected most of 
Harleysville's arguments and had no intention of summarily ruling in favor of 
Harleysville. 
VI. 
In sum, we find the Special Referee correctly found Harleysville failed to reserve 
the right to contest coverage of actual damages and that punitive damages are 
covered under the CGL policies. We also find there is evidence in the record to 
support the Special Referee's factual findings as to the progressive damages 
periods and that the Special Referee did not abuse its discretion in determining 
Harleysville's time on the risk at Magnolia North.  We find loss-of-use actual 
damages at Riverwalk are subject to time-on-the-risk allocation but that punitive 
damages at both developments are not. We thus affirm in the Magnolia North 
matter and affirm as modified in the Riverwalk matter.  
AFFIRMED AND AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.  
Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones dissenting in a separate opinion.
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ACTING JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I respectfully dissent and would reverse and 
remand to the special referee with instructions.
In my view, the critical dates necessary to the determination of the merits here are 
these: 
May 2003: Magnolia North POA sues Heritage 
December 2003:  Riverwalk POA sues Heritage 
December 2003 - January 2004:  Harleysville informs Heritage 
it will defend under a reservation of rights 
November 10, 2005: L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005) becomes 
final. Holds that faulty workmanship that damages only 
the work itself is not an "occurrence" within the meaning 
of a CGL policy. 
January 2009: Riverwalk verdict 
May 2009:  Magnolia North verdict 
October 29, 2009: Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 
187, 684 S.E.2d 541 (2009) becomes final. Holds that 
progressive damage to other materials as the result of 
subcontractor's faulty workmanship is "property damage" 
and therefore a covered occurrence under CGL policy, 
and interprets two policy exclusions.
A. Reservation of Rights
The majority finds Harleysville's notices of its reservation of rights insufficient 
because they (1) failed to notify the insureds of the particular grounds upon which 
it might dispute coverage; (2) did not advise of the need to allocate damages 
between covered and non-covered losses; and (3) did not inform the insureds that 
Harleysville would seek a declaratory judgment if there were adverse jury verdicts.  
I note four things at the outset: (1) the majority cites no South Carolina authority 
that requires this type of information be included in a reservation of rights letter; 
(2) these letters were sent almost two years before L-J became final in November 
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2005, and more than eight months before the initial L-J opinion was filed in 
August 2004, at a time when 'occurrence' and 'property damage' definitions were 
unsettled; (3) the letters were sent more than five and a half years before Newman
held that 'progressive' damages to other materials were property damage, and 
interpreted two standard CGL policy exclusions; and (4) the reservation of rights 
letters were sent by Harleysville to its sophisticated insured, Heritage Builders, and 
not to the POAs who now purport to contest the sufficiency of these notices. 
I disagree with the majority and find the reservation of rights letters to be adequate.  
In support of my conclusion, I quote from a letter sent by Harleysville ("HMIC") 
on January 23, 2004:
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS 
This letter is not intended to waive any of HMIC's rights under
any HMIC insurance policy or at law.  HMIC continues to 
reserve it [sic] rights as set forth in its prior reservation of 
rights, and as set forth herein, including but not limited to the 
following issues: 
1) 	Whether property damage or bodily injury was caused 
by an occurrence as defined by any policy or policies 
and happened during an HMIC policy period;
2) 	Whether notice was provided to HMIC in compliance 
with the notice provision of the policy or policies; 
3) 	Whether the cooperation clause of any policy or 
policies has been complied with; 
4) 	Whether the applicable limits of any and all 
applicable primary or excess policies of insurance 
have, in fact, been exhausted; 
5) 	Whether or not any exclusion applies to preclude 
coverage under any policy or policies; and 
6) 	Any additional coverage defenses which may arise 
during the investigation of this matter. 
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The pleadings seek punitive damages.  HMIC reserves the right 
to disclaim coverage for these since under all of your policies, 
they would not arise from an "occurrence," do not fit the 
definition of "bodily injury" or "property damage," and/or were
"expected and intended" within the meaning of exclusions in 
the policies. 
If there is available to you coverage from any other insurance 
carrier or source in addition to that provided by HMIC, you 
should immediately notify the carrier or source of all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding this matter, and that you have 
been named as a defendant in this lawsuit.  Please notify HMIC 
of the name and address of any such other insurance carrier, and 
of the policy number under which this additional coverage is 
available to you.
Nothing contained in this letter should be deemed a waiver of 
the terms and conditions of the HMIC policy.  HMIC expressly 
reserves the right to rely upon any term or condition of the 
insurance contract or any other ground which may be found to 
limit or preclude coverage. 
In the event that it is determined that there is no coverage for 
this action under the HMIC policy, HMIC expressly reserves 
the right to recover the amounts incurred in the defense of this 
action from you or any of your other insurers that may be liable 
for these costs.
Please advise us of any information that you have that you 
believe may affect our determination concerning the coverage 
available under the HMIC policy. 
HMIC's position is based upon the facts which have been made 
available to it to date.  HMIC expressly reserves the right to 
modify its determination concerning the potential for coverage 
under this policy if the information developed during our 
investigation of this claim warrants the modification. 
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In my opinion, the majority's conclusion  - that this language was insufficient to 
put the builder on notice, and its suggestion that an insurance company must 
explain its position or its reasons in order to reserve its rights, or must specify 
which types of damages it might dispute - is unwarranted, especially when one 
considers these letters and conversations took place between sophisticated 
commercial entities long before L-J had settled (for a time) the meaning of the 
terms "occurrence," and much longer before the Court had interpreted the meaning 
of certain policy exclusions. See, e.g., Newman, supra. 
I would reverse the Special Referee's finding that Harleysville did not effectively 
reserve its rights. To the extent the majority relies upon Newman to suggest 
Harleysville is "at fault in not seeking an allocation of covered damages," I point 
out the verdicts in Riverwalk (January 2009) and in Magnolia North (May 2009) 
predate Newman (October 2009) by at more than five months.  Moreover, there is 
no suggestion how Harleysville could have intervened in these lawsuits and 
asserted a defense against coverage without creating an impermissible conflict of 
interest in violation of established South Carolina law.  See Sims v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 82, 145 S.E.2d 523 (1965).  In my view, nothing in the 
general verdicts bars Harleysville from now litigating its liability under its 
reservation of rights letters. 
For the reasons given above, I would allow Harleysville to litigate its liability, 
including any liability for the punitive damages award, in these declaratory 
judgment actions.  I would also reverse and remand the allocation of damages as
any "time on risk" analysis is necessarily affected by the proper allocation of 
damages, and a determination of their "progression." 
I respectfully dissent.
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WILLIAMS, J.:  The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV) 
appeals the circuit court's order enjoining the DMV from suspending Anna Dillard 
Wilson's driver's license five years after her conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (DUI). We affirm. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 22, 2008, an officer with the Irmo Police Department arrested 
Wilson for DUI. Subsequently, on June 11, 2009, Wilson pleaded guilty to the 
same offense before the Irmo Municipal Court.1  Following her conviction, Wilson 
paid the requisite fines and enrolled in and completed the Alcohol and Drug Safety 
Program (ADSAP).  In August 2009, Wilson contacted a local DMV branch to 
obtain a restricted driver's license.  However, the DMV informed her there was no 
DUI conviction on her record.  Wilson then contacted the Irmo Town Clerk and 
was informed her DUI ticket was sent to the DMV on July 1, 2009.  Thereafter, 
Wilson contacted her insurance agent, who then went to another local DMV branch 
to inquire about the conviction, but was similarly told that no DUI conviction 
existed on Wilson's record. 
The DMV regularly conducts audits of all outstanding tickets for the previous year 
in every jurisdiction that issues a traffic citation, including the Irmo Police 
Department.  Wilson's DUI ticket was included in the audit reports for 2010, 2011, 
and 2013.2  The 2010 and 2011 audit reports indicated the ticket was "in court," 
and the 2013 audit report indicated the ticket was sent to the DMV.  However, the 
DMV did not have a record of receiving the ticket in 2013, and that same year, the 
DMV requested the Irmo Police Department send a certified copy of the ticket.  
Eventually, on May 20, 2014, the DMV received a certified copy of Wilson's 
ticket. On May 27, 2014, four working days after receiving the ticket and nearly 
five years after the DUI conviction, the DMV notified Wilson that her driver's 
license would be suspended as a result of her June 2009 DUI conviction. 
On June 9, 2014, Wilson brought an action against the DMV in the circuit court for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  Wilson also moved for a temporary restraining 
order, which the circuit court granted.  Following a hearing on the issues, the 
circuit court issued an order on March 23, 2015, permanently enjoining the DMV 
from suspending Wilson's driver's license.  In addition to finding that Wilson had 
1 As part of her conviction, Wilson's driver's license was suspended for ninety 
days—running from August 2009 through November 2009—due to her 
noncompliance with the implied consent statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 
(Supp. 2009).
2 The DMV did not receive an audit report from Irmo in 2012.
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no other remedy at law, the court found the five-year lapse between Wilson's 
conviction and her suspension would deprive her of fundamental fairness required 
by due process and cause her undue hardship.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Actions for injunctive relief are equitable in nature."  Hipp v. S.C. Dep't of Motor 
Vehicles, 381 S.C. 323, 324, 673 S.E.2d 416, 416 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting 
Shaw v. Coleman, 373 S.C. 485, 492, 645 S.E.2d 252, 256 (Ct. App. 2007)).  In an 
action in equity, an appellate court may find facts in accordance with its own view 
of the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 325, 673 S.E.2d at 416.
LAW/ANALYSIS  
The DMV argues the circuit court erred in ruling Wilson's driver's license 
suspension would violate standards of fundamental fairness, cause Wilson 
hardship, and leave Wilson without a remedy at law.  We disagree. 
"A person's interest in his driver's license is property that a state may not take away 
without satisfying the requirements of due process. Due process is violated when a 
party is denied fundamental fairness."  Id. at 325, 673 S.E.2d at 417 (internal 
citation omitted). 
Our supreme court has addressed whether suspending one's driver's license after a 
lengthy delay following a DUI conviction violated due process on two prior 
occasions. In State v. Chavis, the supreme court did not find a due process 
violation when the State was not at fault for a one-year delay between William
Chavis's conviction for DUI and the suspension of his driver's license by the 
highway department immediately upon learning of the conviction.  261 S.C. 408, 
409–11, 200 S.E.2d 390, 390–91 (1973).  Specifically, the court noted there was no 
inference or indication in the record that Chavis suffered any prejudice as a result 
of the one-year delay. Id. at 411, 200 S.E.2d at 391. 
Additionally, the court found Chavis did not seek to have his suspensions 
"promptly ordered so that he could get [the suspensions] behind him[,]" but rather, 
"he simply kept quiet and continued to drive in the hope that his license 
suspensions would somehow or other get overlooked and never be imposed."  Id.
Accordingly, the supreme court held a driver is not entitled to relief from the 
imposition of a suspension when an unexplained delay on the part of reporting 
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officials is unaccompanied by a showing of real prejudice to the driver.  Id. at 412, 
200 S.E.2d at 392. The supreme court, however, acknowledged "there might be 
circumstances under which it could be successfully argued or soundly held that the 
State had no right to suspend a driver's license after a long delay."  Id. at 411, 200 
S.E.2d at 391.
In 2009, the supreme court addressed such a circumstance in Hipp. 381 S.C. at 
323, 673 S.E.2d at 416. In that case, Charles Hipp was convicted of DUI in 
Georgia in 1993, but the South Carolina DMV did not receive notice of the 
conviction from Georgia until 2005, and upon receipt, notified Hipp that his 
driver's license would be suspended.  Id. at 324, 325 n.2, 673 S.E.2d at 416, 417 
n.2. The court noted neither the South Carolina DMV nor Hipp was at fault for the 
delay, but instead, recognized that the State of Georgia, alone, was responsible.  Id.
at 325 n.2, 673 S.E.2d at 417 n.2.  Nevertheless, the court found the imposition of a
suspension after a more than twelve-year delay, when Hipp was without fault, was 
"manifestly a denial of fundamental fairness."  Id. at 325, 673 S.E.2d at 417.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, we find a five-year delay between 
Wilson's DUI conviction and the suspension is fundamentally unfair.  Indeed, 
while the DMV claims the facts here—that the DMV did not cause the five-year
delay, Wilson cannot associate any injury to a delay attributable to the DMV, and 
Wilson argued she would have served her suspension earlier had she known about 
it—are akin to Chavis, we find this case falls under the circumstances envisioned 
by our supreme court in Chavis. See 261 S.C. at 411, 200 S.E.2d at 391 ("[T]here 
might be circumstances under which it could be successfully argued or soundly 
held that the State had no right to suspend a driver's license after a long 
delay . . . ."). 
Upon our review, we note the record contains evidence of specific injuries and 
prejudice, which were absent in Chavis, that Wilson believed would result from a 
suspension five years after her conviction.  See id. (finding no standing to
challenge the enforcement of various statutory provisions "in the absence of injury 
or prejudice resulting to [Chavis] from the delay which injury he simply has not 
shown"). Wilson testified she lost her job after her DUI arrest, and it took her two 
years to find new employment as an office manager.  Wilson also stated that, as 
part of her new job, she is required to travel on behalf of the company, and a 
suspension of her driver's license may cause her to lose her current job.  According 
to Wilson, losing her current job would cause severe economic hardship because 
58 

  
 
 
 
 
  
                                        
 
 
 
she has two mortgage payments and would not have a steady stream of income to 
make these payments.  Based on her statements, we find Wilson demonstrated a 
high likelihood of injury or potential prejudice if her driver's license is suspended.3 
Additionally, the record demonstrates that Wilson, after completing the ADSAP 
program in 2009, approached the DMV to find out how to obtain a restricted 
driver's license in lieu of a suspension.  Furthermore, when informed the DMV had
no record of her DUI conviction, Wilson contacted the Irmo Town Clerk to inquire 
about the status of her conviction, and even sent her insurance agent to the DMV to 
inquire about filing insurance forms related to her DUI conviction.  Thus, we find 
Wilson did not simply "keep quiet" about her suspension, but instead, actively 
sought a resolution to her pending suspension. Cf. id. ("For aught the record 
shows, [Chavis] simply kept quiet and continued to drive in the hope that his 
license suspensions would somehow or other get overlooked and never be 
imposed."). 
Finally, the DMV asserts Wilson acted with unclean hands, and according to Hipp, 
she was not denied fundamental fairness because she was responsible for the delay 
as she "was the only one that knew, at that time, her DUI conviction had not been 
reported to the DMV as required."  We, however, find this argument is not 
preserved for review because the DMV failed to plead the doctrine of unclean 
hands as an affirmative defense in its answer or raise it to the circuit court.4 See 
3 The DMV notes several cases from other jurisdictions upholding suspensions 
after lengthy delays in support of its argument that an administrative delay must be 
accompanied by a showing of prejudice to a substantial right to violate due process 
and fundamental fairness.  While we are mindful of these cases, we find them
unpersuasive and distinguishable from the instant case because the outer limit of 
the delays in any of the other cases is three-and-a-half years, whereas here, the 
facts involve a five-year delay and a showing of prejudice.  
4 We also find that any argument relating to Wilson not having another remedy at 
law is either unpreserved or abandoned.  Initially, we note that, in its final brief, the 
DMV contends the circuit erred in ruling that Wilson has no other remedy at law.  
However, the DMV cites no legal authority and its argument is largely conclusory.  
Thus, we believe the DMV has abandoned this issue and we need not address its 
merits. See Snow v. Smith, 416 S.C. 72, 91 n.7, 784 S.E.2d 242, 252 n.7 (Ct. App. 
2016) (finding the appellants abandoned their argument because they failed to 
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Allendale Cty. Bank v. Cadle, 348 S.C. 367, 377–78, 559 S.E.2d 342, 347–48 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (finding an issue not preserved for review because the appellants failed 
to plead the doctrine of unclean hands as an affirmative defense). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we find, under the facts of this particular case, the imposition of a 
suspension after a five-year delay is a denial of fundamental fairness in violation of 
due process when sufficient evidence of prejudice exists in the record and neither 
party is at fault for the delay.  Thus, based on the analysis set forth above, the 
circuit court's order enjoining the DMV from suspending Wilson's driver's license 
is 
AFFIRMED. 5 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
provide legal citations or authority).  To the extent the DMV argues another 
remedy exists or Wilson's hardship is reduced because she can now install an 
ignition interlock device on her car pursuant to the retroactivity clause in Emma's
Law, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2941(T) (Supp. 2016), we find this argument is not 
preserved because it was first raised in the DMV's reply brief. See Spivey ex rel. 
Spivey v. Carolina Crawler, 367 S.C. 154, 161, 624 S.E.2d 435, 438 (Ct. App. 
2005) (refusing to consider issues first raised in the reply brief). 
5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
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